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Abstract
The Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 (“Act”) was introduced to move the U.S. Embassy in Is-
rael to Jerusalem. In addition to policy issues, which have been the subject of considerable debate,
the Act raises interesting questions concerning the scope of congressional and executive authority
in the conduct of foreign affairs, and the extent to which Congress can use its appropriations power
to influence executive action in this area. President Clinton opposed the Dole-Kyl Bill on policy
grounds and the Justice Department prepared a memorandum (“Memorandum”) arguing that the
Dole-Kyl Bill is unconstitutional. Essentially, the Memorandum argued that the Bill: (1) interfered
with the President’s power to conduct foreign affairs and make decisions pertaining to recognition,
and (2) is an inappropriate exercise of Congress’ appropriations power because it includes an un-
constitutional condition. The issue is whether Congress can enact legislation that may effect U.S.
foreign policy interests, and whether it can do so by use of the appropriations power. Long estab-
lished practice, the writings of scholars and statesmen, and judicial decisions, all indicate that the
answer to both is clearly yes.
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I. BACKGROUND
This year marks three thousand years since Jerusalem was
first established as the capital of a Jewish state by King David.
Although Jerusalem was captured by the Roman Empire some
two thousand years ago and has been ruled by a number of states
and empires since then, it has never been the capital of any
other state.1 It has had ajewish majority since 1830 and was for-
mally re-established as the capital of a Jewish state in 1950.2 In a
fitting tribute to the celebration of the 3000th anniversary, Sena-
tors Dole and Kyl introduced a Bill ("Dole-Kyl Bill") to move the
U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem.' The Dole-Kyl Bill was
adopted, with some amendments, on October 24, 1995, by a vote
of 93 to 5 in the Senate4 and a vote of 374 to 37 in the House of
Representatives,5 and became law on November 8, 1995.6
* Professor of international and U.S. foreign relations law, Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, formerly Counselor on International Law, U.S. Department of State,
Office of the Legal Adviser. An earlier version of this Essay, Can Congress Move An Em-
bassy?, appeared in the LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 9, 1995, at 46, replinted in the Congressional
Record, 141 CONG. REC. S15177-9 (daily ed. Oct 10, 1995). The Author wishes to thank
Jennifer Frankel, Cardozo 97', for her assistance in the preparation of this Essay.
1. For a brief historical and legal survey of the status of Jerusalem since 1517, see
THEJERUSALEM QUESTION AND ITS REsOLUTION: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, at xix-xxix (Ruth
Lapidoth & Moshe Hirsch, eds. 1994); Ruth Lapidoth, Jerusalem and the Peace Process, 28
ISRAEL L. REv. 402 (1994).
2. Divrei Haknesset, 2d Sess., No. 11, at 603 (1950). The Knesset resolution
adoptedJanuary 23, 1950, stated, "[w]ith the creation of aJewish state,Jerusalem again
became its capital." Id. David Ben Gurion, one of the f6unding fathers of Israel and its
first Prime Minister, argued against the adoption of a proposed resolution declaring
Jerusalem to be the capital of Israel, prospectively, and persuaded the Knesset to adopt
the resoltuion quoted above, which confirmed Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel.
Ben Gurion stated, "[flor the State of Israel there has always been and always will be
one capital only -Jerusalem the eternal. Thus it was 3,000 years ago - and thus it will
be, we believe, until the end of time." JERUSALEM MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1
ISRAEL'S FOREIGN RELATIONS: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, 1947-1974, at 226 (Meron Medzini
ed., 1976) (citing Divrei Haknesset). See also Shlomo Slonim, The United States and the
Status ofJerusalem, 1947-1984, 19 ISRAEL L. REv. 179 (1984).
3. S. 1322, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1995) (introduced on May 25, 1995).
4. 141 CONG. REG. D1242-02 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995).
5. 141 CONG. REG. H10680 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995).
6. Although the Congressional Record states that it was signed, see CONG. REC. D
1325 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1995), that is apparently an error. After the bill was submitted to
the President on October 26, 1995, he had 10 days, starting October 27, 1995, in which
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The law, to be cited as the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 19957
("Act"), makes a number of findings, including that Jerusalem
has been the capital of Israel since 19508 and that the U.S. main-
tains its embassy in the functioning capital of every country ex-
cept Israel.9 The Act declares it to be the policy of the United
States that 'Jerusalem shall remain an undivided city in which
the rights of every ethnic and religious group are protected," 10
that 'Jerusalem should be recognized as the capital of Israel," a"
and "that the United States embassy in Israel should be estab-
lished in Jerusalem no later than May 31, 1999."12
The Act provides that not less than US$25 million in 1996
and US$75 million in 1997, of the funds to be appropriated for
Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad for the State
Department, shall be made available for the construction and
other costs associated with the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in
Israel to Jerusalem, 3 and that not more than fifty percent of the
funds appropriated in 1999 may be obligated until the Secretary
of State determines and reports to Congress that the U.S. Em-
bassy in Jerusalem has officially opened.1 4 The President may,
however, suspend the fifty percent limitation for successive six
month periods "if [he] determines and reports to Congress...
that such suspension is necessary to protect the national security
interests of the United States." 5 It requires the Secretary of
State to report to Congress within thirty days of the adoption of
to act on the legislation. Since he did not sign the bill within that period and Congress
was in session, it automatically became law on November 8, 1995. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 7 ("If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays ex-
cepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like
Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its
Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.").
7. Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995, 104 Pub. L. No. 45, 109 Stat. 398 (1995).
8. Id. § 2(2).
9. Id. § 2(15).
10. Id. § 3(a)(1).
11. Id. § 3(a)(2).
12. Id. § 3(a)(3).
13. Id. §§ 4(a), 4(b).
14. Id. § 3(b).
15. Id. § 7(a)(2). This provision was not in the bill initially introduced by Senator
Dole. Senator Dole agreed to add the waiver provision, requested by the White House,
"despite having the votes to prevail," without it, in "the interest of getting the broadest
possible support - we hope, even including the support of the White House." 141
CONG. REc. S15522, at 515527 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Sen. Robert
Dole).
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the Act on the State Department's plans to implement the Act, 6
and every six months thereafter on the cost of implementing the
various phases of the Act, and on the progress made towards
opening the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem.17
In addition to policy issues, which have been the subject of
considerable debate,"8 the Act raises interesting questions con-
cerning the scope of congressional and executive authority in
the conduct of foreign affairs, and the extent to which Congress
can use its appropriations power to influence executive action in
this area.
President Clinton opposed the Dole-Kyl Bill on policy
grounds19 and the Justice Department prepared a memorandum
("Memorandum") arguing that the Dole-Kyl Bill is unconstitu-
tional.2" Essentially, the Memorandum argued that the Bill: (1)
interfered with the President's power to conduct foreign affairs
and make decisions pertaining to recognition, and (2) is an in-
appropriate exercise of Congress' appropriations power because
it includes an unconstitutional condition.
II. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER
Contrary to popular impression, the U.S. Constitution does
not vest the "foreign affairs" power in the President. It does not
16. Id. § 5.
17. Id. § (6).
18. Those who opposed the bill argued that it would undermine the "peace-pro-
cess." See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs, OJerusalem, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
1995, at 15. However, the site of the proposed U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem (purchased
by the United States years ago), is in the Western part ofJerusalem, which has been part
of Israel since 1948. Moreover, as Douglas Feith has pointed out, refusal to move the
Embassy would undermine the "peace-process" by falsely suggesting that sovereignty
over Jerusalem might be negotiable. See Douglas J. Feith, To Provide Peace, Move the
Embassy, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1995, at 21 ("The cause of peace will be served by whatever
helps persuade Yasir Arafat that he will not get American support or Israeli consent to
divide Jerusalem and establish part of it as the capital of a new Arab state.").
19. See, Thomas W. Lippman, Dole Seeks to Make Jerusalem Home of U.S. Embassy in
Israel, WASH. POST, May 10, 1995, at A29; Hillel Kuttler, Administration Fighting Dole Em-
bassy Bill, JERUSALEM PosT, May 11, 1995, at 10.
20. Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Dept. of
Justice to AbnerJ. Mikva, Counsel to the President (May 16, 1995). Although the provi-
sion authorizing the President to postpone opening the embassy in Jerusalem by succes-
sive six month increments was added after the Justice Department issued its memoran-
dum, and may have lessened the President's policy objections to it, the amendment has
no bearing on the question of Congress's constitutional authority to legislate on this
subject.
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vest the "foreign affairs" power in any branch. Indeed, the Con-
stitution makes no reference to "foreign affairs." The Constitu-
tion vests some powers that impact on foreign affairs in the Presi-
dent, others in the President and the Senate jointly, and still
others in Congress. The Constitution provides that only the
President "shall receive ambassadors." It also gives the President
the power to appoint ambassadors, but only with the advice and
consent of the Senate,21 and to make treaties, provided two-
thirds of the Senate concurs.22 The Constitution gives Congress
a number of powers affecting the conduct of foreign affairs in-
cluding the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations,"
to "establish uniform rules of naturalization," to "coin money
and regulate the value of foreign coin," to "provide for the pun-
ishment of counterfeiters," to "define and punish piracies and
felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the
Law of Nations," to "declare war, grant letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make rules concerning capture on land and
water," to "raise and support armies," and to "provide and main-
tain a navy."2  In the words of one prominent commentator,
"the Constitution... is an invitation to struggle for the privilege
of directing American foreign policy."24
If one looks at the Constitution's specific grants of power,
Congress has by far the greater share. Nevertheless, it has long
been recognized that the President has a special role in the con-
duct of foreign affairs. John Marshall stated, in a speech made
while he was a member of the House of Representatives, "the
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,
and its sole representative with foreign nations."2 5 Similarly, Jef-
ferson stated, "the President [is the] only channel of communi-
cation between this country and foreign nations."2 6 It should be
noted, however, that both Marshall and Jefferson were speaking
of communication with foreign nations, not of the power to make
foreign policy.27
21. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
22. Id.
23. Id. art. I, § 8.
24. EDWARD CORWIN,' THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1984, at 201.
(1984).
25. Id. at 207.
26. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 221 (1972) (quoting
Thomas Jefferson).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
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Probably the most comprehensive Supreme Court discus-
sion of foreign affairs powers is Justice Sutherland's opinion in
United States v. Curtiss-Wight.28 In Curtiss-Wright, decided in
1936, the Court sustained a statute authorizing the President to
order an embargo on arms to Bolivia, 9 a delegation of Congres-
sional authority that would have been unacceptable at that time
with respect to domestic regulation. Justice Sutherland dis-
cussed various bases for federal authority over foreign affairs,
and argued that in foreign affairs, as distinct from domestic af-
fairs, the authority of the Federal Government does not depend
on a grant of power by the States.3 ° Turning to the specific issue
before the Court, the President's authority to declare an em-
bargo, Justice Sutherland stated, "[w]e are dealing here not
alone with an ,authority vested in the President by exercise of
legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very deli-
cate plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole or-
gan of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions. 3
1
The Constitution also makes no reference to recognition.
The provision that the President "shall receive ambassadors,"
now considered the basis of the President's power over recogni-
tion, is included in Section 3 of Article II, listing what the Presi-
dent may or shall do, not in Section 2 of Article II, which lists
"presidential powers. ' 32 The power to receive ambassadors was
described by Alexander Hamilton in the Pacificus-Helvidius de-
bates as, "more a matter of dignity than of authority" and "a cir-
cumstance which will be without consequence in the administra-
tion of the government."33  Historically, however, presidents
have made decisions concerning recognition, starting with
George Washington's recognition of the French Republic. In
United States v. Belmont3 4 and United States v. Pink,35 the Supreme
28. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
29. Id. at 332-33.
30. Id. at 318-19.
31. Id. at 320.
32. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 41 ("while appointing ambassadors and making trea-
ties are described as presidential powers (Article II, section 2), receiving ambassadors is
included in section 3 which only lists things the President 'may' and 'shall' do but does
not speak in terms of power").
33. The Federalist No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
34. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
35. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
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Court held that an executive agreement recognizing the Soviet
Government and providing for the settlement of claims between
the United States and the Soviet Union superseded inconsistent
state law, implicitly accepting the executive's authority over rec-
ognition.3 6
The Court's reference to the President's broad powers in
foreign affairs in Curtiss-Wright and other cases cited in the Mem-
orandum, 37 and the Court's implied acceptance of the execu-
tive's authority to recognize foreign governments in Belmont and
Pink, were made in situations in which Congress either dele-
gated authority to the executive or in which Congress was silent.
None involved a conflict between Congress and the President.
The Supreme Court has never held that Congress could not
exercise one of its constitutional powers because doing so would
interfere with the President's powers over the conduct of foreign
affairs."8 The Court has held the converse: that Presidential ac-
tion, which might have been constitutional if Congress had not
acted, was unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with legis-
lation enacted by Congress.39 In Youngstown Sheet and Tube v.
Sawyer,4" the Court held that notwithstanding the President's
constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief, President Tru-
man's seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War to ensure
that a threatened strike did not stop the production of steel
needed for the conduct of war, was illegal because the seizure
was inconsistent with the Taft-Hartley Act for resolving labor dis-
putes.41 Justice Jackson, who had been President Franklin Del-
ano Roosevelt's Attorney General and a strong proponent of
broad executive authority, concurred in an opinion which has
become the classic statement on the scope of executive-legisla-
tive power. He wrote:
A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the
36. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330; Pink, 315 U.S. at 222-23.
37. See Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529 (1988); Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705-06 n.18 (1976); United States v.
Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960) (cited in Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra
note 20).
38. In United States v. Klein, the Court made clear that legislation that impaired
the effect of a Presidential pardon would be an unconstitutional infringement on the
powers of the executive. 80 U.S. 128 (1872).
39. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 588 (1952).
40. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
41. Id. at 587-89.
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poverty of really useful and unambiguous authority applica-
ble to concrete problems of executive power as they actually
present themselves. Just what our forefathers did envision, or
would have envisioned had they foreseen modern conditions,
must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the
dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A
century and a half of partisan debate and scholarly specula-
tion yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt
quotations from respected sources on each side of any ques-
tion. They largely cancel each other. And court decisions are
indecisive because of the judicial practice of dealing with the
largest questions in the most narrow way.
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does
not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power
of any of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single
Articles torn from context. While the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that
practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Presidential
powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their dis-
junction or conjunction with those of Congress. We may well
begin by a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical sit-
uations in which a President may doubt, or others may chal-
lenge, his powers, and by distinguishing roughly the legal
consequences of this factor of relativity.
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all the
Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these
only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify
the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional
under these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal
Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure
executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress
would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the
widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as
1996] 1385
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a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on in-
dependent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its low-
est ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in
such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon
the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclu-
sive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what
is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional
system.42
Jackson cited Curtiss-Wright as an example of the first class of
cases, in which, he said, "we find the broadest statements of pres-
idential power," and noted that "that case involved not the Presi-
dent's power to act without Congressional authority, but the
question of his authority to act under and in accord with an Act
of Congress."4 3 He concluded, "[i] t was intimated that the Presi-
dent might act in external affairs without congressional author-
ity, but not that he might act contrary to an Act of Congress. " '
Although the Act does not explicitly require the President
to relocate the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, the findings thatJeru-
salem is the capital of Israel and that Israel is the only state in
which the United States does not have its embassy in the capital;
the assertion that it is the policy of the United States that the
embassy be in Jerusalem; the allocation of funds for the reloca-
tion and construction of an embassy in Jerusalem; the prohibi-
tion on the use of some of the funds appropriated to the State
Department for the acquisition and maintenance of buildings
abroad if the embassy is not opened by May 1999, clearly indi-
cates the purpose of Congress to commence construction on the
U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem no later than 1997 and to open the
embassy no later than May 31, 1999. Under the Jackson analysis,
were the President to take "measures incompatible with the ex-
42. Id. at 634-38.
43. Id. at 637.
44. Id. (emphasis added).
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pressed or implied will of Congress,"4" his power would be "at its
lowest ebb."46 He could "rely only upon his own constitutional
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the
matter. "117 Such exclusive presidential control could be sus-
tained "only by disabling Congress from acting upon the sub-
ject.""s As Jackson noted, "[p] residential claim to power at once
so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution,
for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitu-
tional system."49 While the question has never been decided, it
is unlikely that a court would hold that the President's authority
to receive ambassadors-his power to appoint ambassadors re-
quires the advice and consent of the Senate-minus the power
of Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause and the
Spending Clause of the Constitution, is sufficient to sustain ex-
clusive presidential control, disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject.
III. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY UNDER THE NECESSARY
AND PROPER AND SPENDING PROVISIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTION
Both the necessary and proper clause 50 and the spending
clause5" have been broadly interpreted to permit Congress to
legislate on a wide scope of matters. The Necessary and Proper
Clause authorizes Congress not only to make all laws necessary
and proper to implement the enumerated powers of Congress,
but all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
execution all powers vested "in the government of the United States or
in any department or officer thereof"52 Thus, even if recognition is
considered an executive power-on the basis of historical prece-
dent, if not constitutional provision-Congress has the power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact legislation con-
cerning the location and construction of U.S. embassies abroad.
Clearly, the Act is also a proper exercise of Congress' spend-
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 638.
49. Id.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
51. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
52. Id. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18 (emphasis added).
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ing power. That the use of the spending power is not limited to
those areas that Congress could otherwise regulate was made
clear by the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler.53 Justice
Roberts, writing for the majority, stated:
[the first clause of article I Section 8] confers a power sepa-
rate and distinct from those later enumerated, is not re-
stricted in meaning by the grant of them, and Congress con-
sequently has a substantive power to tax and to appropriate,
limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for
the general welfare of the United States.54
Admittedly, Congress cannot use the spending power to im-
pose unconstitutional conditions. Thus, the Supreme Court has
held that Congress cannot use the appropriations power to vio-
late the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,55 the
compensation clause in Article III,56 or the prohibition on bills
of attainder in Article I, Section 9.57 The principle that has
emerged from these cases is that Congress cannot use the spend-
ing power to achieve that which the Constitution prohibits. Ap-
propriating funds for the relocation and construction of an em-
bassy and limiting the expenditure of funds appropriated for the
acquisition and maintenance of buildings abroad if construction
is not started and completed on specified dates, do not violate
any prohibition of the Constitution.
Butler, decided over half a century ago, is the only case in
which the Court held a federal appropriation invalid because of
the unconstitutionality of a condition that did not involve in-
fringement of individual rights.5" The majority in Butler took the
position that Congress could not use federal funds to induce
states to enact regulations that Congress could not enact under
53. 297 U.S. 1, 74 (1936).
54. Id. at 65-66 (emphasis added).
55. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
56. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980).
57. United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946). In Lovett Congress provided by
an amendment in an appropriations bill that no salaries should be paid to certain indi-
viduals out of monies appropriated unless they were reappointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Although the persons who were denied compen-
sation and the Solicitor General of the United States argued that the provision was an
unconstitutional interference with the powers of the President to remove executive em-
ployees; id. at 304-05, the Court did not consider the question; it held that the provi-
sion constituted a bill of attainder. Id. at 315.
58. See Comment, The Federal Conditional Spending Power: A Search for Limits, 70 Nw.
U. L. REv. 293, 307 (1975).
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its enumerated powers. 59 Within a year of that decision, the
Court sustained conditional appropriations in areas outside the
scope of Congress' enumerated powers.60 Since then, Congress
has enacted numerous statutes in which it used the spending
power to achieve results that it could not have achieved by regu-
lating the conduct directly.61 The Court has "never invalidated
such an enactment. 6
2
Most recently, in South Dakota v. Dole,63 the Supreme Court
rejected a state argument that Congress could not use federal
highway funding to achieve a national minimum drinking age
because the Twenty-First Amendment gave the states the power
to make that decision.' The Court stated:
[T]he 'independent constitutional bar' limitation on the
spending power is not, as petitioner suggests, a prohibition
on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is
not empowered to achieve directly. Instead, we think that the
language in our earlier opinions stands for the unexceptiona-
ble proposition that the power may not be used to induce the
States to engage in activities that would themselves be uncon-
stitutional. Thus, for example, a grant of federal funds condi-
tioned on invidiously discriminatory state action or the inflic-
tion of cruel and unusual punishment would be an illegiti-
mate exercise of the Congress' broad spending power. But no
such claim can be or is made here. Were South Dakota to
succumb to the blandishments offered by Congress and raise
its drinking age to 21, the State's action in so doing would not
violate the constitutional rights of anyone.65
Moreover, in Butler, the Court held that Congress could not
use the spending power to limit states' rights. The Court has
never held that Congress cannot limit the proper exercise of
power by another branch of the Federal Government by the use
of its appropriations authority unless the matter falls within one
59. Butler, 297 U.S. at 78.
60. See Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937);- Helvery v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619 (1937).
61. See Lynn Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911
(1995). "Federal funds totalling billions of dollars each year contribute to an increas-
ingly large portion of each State's revenue. And none of this money is offered to the
states unconditionally." Id. at 1918.
62. Id. at 1924.
63. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 210.
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of the enumerated powers of Congress. Such a holding would
vitiate what has been considered one of the most important-if
not the most important-of the checks and balances: Congress'
power of the purse. As a recent U.S. District Court decision
stated,
[t]hough the parameters of Congress' powers may be
contested, Congress surely has a role to play in aspects of for-
eign affairs, as the Constitution expressly recognized and the
Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed. The most
prominent among these Congressional powers is of course
the general appropriations power.66
That Congress can use the spending power to limit the ex-
ecutive's constitutional powers is well established.67 Consider,
for example, the President's power as Commander-in-Chief.
Although the Constitution provides that the President shall be
Commander-in-Chief,68 and the Supreme Court stated almost
150 years ago that that encompasses the power "to direct the
movements of the naval and military forces at his command and
to employ them in the manner he may deem most effectual to
harass and conquer and subdue the enemy,"69 Congress has re-
peatedly used its funding power to limit military action by the
President.7 ° Indeed, in some of the cases involving challenges to
the Vietnam War, courts have stated that Congress' failure to
prohibit the President from using funds for the Vietnam con-
flict, or for certain aspects of it, constituted Congressional au-
thorization for the action in question.7' If Congress can exercise
its appropriations power to limit the President's power as Com-
mander-in-Chief, a power specifically provided for in the Consti-
tution, afortiori it can exercise the appropriations power to limit
the President's foreign affairs power, a power that is not ex-
66. U.S. v. Oliver North, 708 F. Supp. 380, 382, n. 3 (D.D.C. 1988).
67. See CORWIN, supra note 24, at 222 (noting that Congress can refuse to appropri-
ate funds or enact inconsistent legislation).
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
69. Fleming v. Paye, 50 U.S. (9 Hay.) 602, 615 (1850).
70. See L. Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings, 83 AJ.I.L. 758, 763
(1989).
71. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307, 1313, 1314 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). See asoJOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILIY: CON-
STITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993). "Congress had by then, by
a number of appropriations measures, quite pointedly reiterated its authorization of
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pressly vested in the President but implied from other powers
and that is shared with Congress.
Since World War II, Congress has consistently used appro-
priations as a means of controlling some aspects of foreign pol-
icy.7" One prominent commentator characterized the assertion
that Congress cannot control foreign affairs by withholding ap-
propriations as "the most startling constitutional claim emanat-
ing from the Iran contra hearings".73 Or, as another prominent
publicist put it, assertions "that foreign affairs just aren't any of
Congress's business.., bear no relation to the language or pur-
poses of the founding document, or the first century and a half
of our history."74
IV. CONCLUSION
Even strong proponents of broad executive power in for-
eign affairs agree that Congress can use the appropriations
power to effect the conduct of foreign affairs. Thus, Secretary of
State Kissinger conceded, following the President's confronta-
tions with Congress during the Vietnam war:
The decade long struggle in this country over executive domi-
nance in foreign affairs is over. The recognition that Con-
gress is a coequal branch of government is the dominant fact
of national politics today. The executive accepts that Con-
gress must have both the sense and the reality of participa-
tion: foreign policy must be a shared enterprise. 75
Professor Louis Henkin, the Chief Reporter for the latest Re-
statement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law76 and one of the lead-
ing authorities in the field stated, "Congress has insisted and
presidents have reluctantly accepted that in foreign affairs as in
domestic affairs, spending is expressly entrusted to Congress. " "
Whatever the respective powers of Congress and the Presi-
dent to decide whether to recognize a foreign state-a question
on which the Constitution is silent and the Court has never
ruled- that issue is not raised by the Jerusalem Embassy Act.
72. See Smith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1360.
73. Fisher, supra note 70, at 758.
74. Ely, supra note 71, at 62.
75. 72 DEP'T ST. BULL. 562 (1975).
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. (1987).
77. HENKIN, supra note 26, at 114.
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The United States recognized Israel when it was established in
1948. It was the first state to do so. Rather, the issue is whether
Congress can enact legislation that may effect U.S. foreign policy
interests, and whether it can do so by use of the appropriations
power. Long established practice, the writings of scholars and
statesmen, and judicial decisions, all indicate that the answer to
both is clearly yes.
